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Abstract
The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic peaked very early in comparison to the thresholds predicted
by an analysis of prior lockdown regimes. The most convenient explanation is that some,
external factor changed the value of the basic reproduction number, r0; and there certainly
are arguments for this. Other factors could, nonetheless, have played a role. This research
attempts to reconcile the observed peak with the thresholds predicted by lockdown regimes
similar to the one in force at the time. It contemplates the effect of two, different, hypotheti-
cal errors in the data: The first is that the true level of infection has been underestimated by
a multiplicative factor, while the second is that of an imperceptible, pre-existing, immune
fraction of the population. While it is shown that it certainly is possible to manufacture the
perception of an early peak as extreme as the one observed, solely by way of these two phe-
nomena, the values need to be fairly high. The phenomena would not, by any measure, be
insignificant. It also remains an inescapable fact that the early peak in infections coincided
with a fairly profound change in r0; in all the contemplated scenarios of data-deficiency.
Keywords: Pandemic; SARS-CoV-2; Covid-19; data; basic reproduction number; threshold;
epidemic; South Africa.
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1 Introduction
On around the 18th of July, 2020, the incidence of SARS-CoV-2 cases peaked and the number
of active infections followed suit around five days later. Either some unknown factor caused
the basic reproduction number, r0, to drop below unity, around the 13th of July (the mean
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SARS-CoV-2 incubation period is 5.2 days [14]), or the threshold had been reached. All this
transpired at an apparently very low level of total infection, a mere 0.7 % of the population; or,
couching this in the more conventional terms of susceptability, 99.3 %. Such a threshold would
imply a basic reproductive number less than 1.01. On the 13th of July, South Africa did revert
to a lockdown regime similar to its previous level 4 lockdown (r0 = 1.69), referred to in this
work as “level 3.5”, however, as much as prohibition, curfews and a number of other measures
were reinstated, the threshold predicted by an analysis of the level 4 lockdown regime, suggests
that a new regime, in itself, was not enough to cause the observed peak. A basic reproductive
number of 1.01 is exceptionally marginal. How does one explain this conundrum?
It is already known that the perception of a peak at 99.3 % is based on infection-data which
are deficient by an order of magnitude, or even greater. The head of the CDC, Robert Red-
field’s opinion on the topic of asymptomatic or undiagnosed SARS-CoV-2 infections, in the
U.S.A., is that antibody testing reveals that “A good rough estimate now is 10 to 1” ([5]) and
others, in similar positions all over the world, have expressed similar sentiments. Redfield’s
factor of eleven also needs to be revised upward if one considers that, although antibodies lend
themselves favourably to the diagnosis of immunity, they are not the ultimate indicator. Unde-
tected, T-cell mediated immunity can exist in the absence of a positive antibody test. In South
Africa, epidemiologists have focussed on excess deaths and put forward a value of 1.59 ([10],
[4] and [3]). There is not necessarily any conflict between this apparently, relatively low num-
ber of excess deaths and Redfield’s statement, if one considers the obvious bias in detection: If
you’re so sick that you’re about to die, you’re more likely to seek out medical assistance and
be diagnosed. It may also be worth keeping in mind that a massive 57 % of the inhabitants
of the Mumbai slum areas of Chembur, Matunga and Dahisar tested positive for exposure to
SARS-CoV-2 [1]. That the SARS-CoV-2 virus is often insiduous and infection data are conse-
quently incorrect by a factor is therefore already a widely recognised phenomenon. This fact,
alone, is nonetheless unable to reasonably explain the SARS-CoV-2 threshold observed in the
South African data, without contemplating improbably-high, though not impossible, values.
The question then arises as to whether the SARS-CoV-2 virus really is novel and the population
really is naive, or whether some other pathogen, genetics, etc. has not imparted an undetectable
immunity to a significant fraction of the population. Although antibodies lend themselves
favourably to the diagnosis of immunity, they are not the ultimate indicator. As already stated,
undetected, T-cell mediated immunity can exist in the absence of a positive antibody test.
This research attempts to reconcile the observed peak in South African infections with the
thresholds predicted by lockdown regimes similar to the one in force at the time. It contem-
plates the effect of two, different, hypothetical errors in the data: The first is that the true level
of infection has been underestimated by a multiplicative factor, denoted a, while the second
is that of an imperceptible, pre-existing, immune fraction of the population, denoted b. Since
the rules in place at the time of the peak were most similar to level 4, the values of a and
b explored were mostly selected on the basis that they manufacture an erroneously-detected,
99.3 % threshold for the level 4 lockdown.
Of course, it is possible that some, other, external factor, caused the basic reproduction number
to plummet, around the 13th of July, and a quantification of lockdown regimes means nothing
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if the public at large were not compliant with the rules.
2 The Erroneous Perception Created by Inexplicable Immu-
nity and Asymptomatic, or Undiagnosed, Infections
Suppose that S(t), I(t) and R(t) represent the usual quantities in Kermack and McKendrick’s
SIR model [13]. Suppose that a tilde is used to further distinguish detected values of these
quantities, which for the purposes of this exposition, will be erroneous. If, for some presently
inexplicable reason, there is an imperceptible, pre-existing immune fraction of the population,
b, then R(0) = R˜(0) + b, for an epidemic that begins at some time, t = 0. Suppose one were
to further determine that both I˜(t) and therefore, the resistant portion arising from the current
epidemic, R˜(t)− R˜(0), are in actual fact higher by some factor, a. That is,
I(t) = aI˜(t) and R(t) = a
[
R˜(t)− R˜(0)
]
+ R˜(0) + b.
Substituting these quantities into
S(t) = 1− I(t)−R(t)
= 1− a
[
I˜(t) +
(
R˜(t)− R˜(0)
)]
− R˜(0)− b
= 1− a+ a
[
1−
(
I˜(t) + R˜(t)
)]
− (1− a)R˜(0)− b
= aS˜(t) + (1− a)[1− R˜(0)]− b, (1)
in which S˜(t) = 1− I˜(t)− R˜(t).
In the particular case of the South African, SARS-CoV-2 peak, S˜(t) = 0.993 and R˜(0) = 0.
Equation (1) therefore simplifies to
S(t) = 1− 0.007× a− b. (2)
The true value of the erroneously-detected 99.3 % threshold therefore depends on the values of
both a and b, some examples of which are given in Table 1.
Changing the subject of Equation (1),
S˜(t) =
1
a
[
S(t) + (a− 1)[1− R˜(0)] + b
]
. (3)
This is a formula for the perceived susceptable fraction that will be erroneously detected for
given values of a and b.
3 The Data and Their Interpretation
Epidemiological data are usually presented in the format “numbers of current infections” and
“total number of cases”. The present case of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic is no exception. The
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Detected Threshold, S˜ /% a b True Value, S /%
99.3 1.0 0.1 89.3
" 10 0.0 93.0
" 10 0.83 10.0
" 20 0.65 21.0
" 30 0.5 21.0
" 60 0.0 58.0
Table 1: Some examples of what the true value of an erroneously-detected peak of 99.3 %
would be, based on the substitution of various values of a and b into Equation (2).
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data for the level-5 lockdown, the level-4 lockdown, the early level-3 lockdown and Sweden
were already interpreted in [12] and may be found in Table 2. The final level-3 and so-called
level-3.5 values, in Table 2, were determined as follows.
The Level-3 Lockdown
The level-3 lockdown commenced on the 1st of June and was still in force up until the 12th
of July. Once again, a period of 15 days was allowed for the viral incubation period and the
subsequent diagnosis of an infection. Once again, it was also assumed that the termination of
the level-3 lockdown would not reflect in the data for at least 24 hours. Curves were accordingly
fitted to the subset of data ([7], [6] and [2]) which commenced on the 16 of June and terminated
on the 13th of July. The curves fitted to the data, using Gnuplot, are depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Level-3, best fits to SARS-CoV-2, infection data (16th of June to the 13th of July,
2020).
The formula for the “total infections” curve is
35963.9 e0.048776 t − 2993.68
and the formula for the “active infections” curve is
29735 e0.040912 t − 26225.1.
The values these formulae yield for the relevant dates are provided in Table 2.
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The Level-3.5 Lockdown
The so-called level-3.5 lockdown commenced on the 13th of July and was in force up until
the 17th of August. Once again, a period of 15 days was allowed for the viral incubation
period and the subsequent diagnosis of an infection. Once again, it was also assumed that the
termination of the level-3 lockdown would not reflect in the data for at least 24 hours. Curves
were accordingly fitted to the subset of data ([7], [6] and [2]) which commenced on the 28th
of July and terminated on the 18th of August. The curves fitted to the data, using Gnuplot, are
depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Level-3.5, best fits to SARS-CoV-2, infection data (28th of July to the 18th of August,
2020).
The formula for the “total infections” curve is
−196.038 t2 + 21230.6 t+ 21520
and the formula for the “active infections” curve is
−91.4826 t2 + 3683.11 t+ 133275
The values these formulae yield for the relevant dates are provided in Table 2.
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Converting the Conventional, Epidemiological Format into S(t) and I(t)
The epidemiological data have been presented in their usual format “numbers of current infec-
tions” and “total number of cases”. If N is the size of the population, “active infections” are
just I˜(t)N and “total infections” are just [I˜(t) + R˜(t)− R˜(0)]N . Realising this, the values of
S(t) and I(t) needed for this work can be obtained from
S(t) =
N − a× total infections
N
− R˜(0)− b
and
I(t) =
a× active infections
N
.
In 2020, the size of the South African population was estimated to be 59 140 502 by [8].
4 Calculation of the Basic Reproduction Number, r0
The basic reproduction number, r0, was calculated according to the formula derived in [12]
from Kermack and McKendrick’s SIR equations [13]. That is,
r0 =
ln
[
S(t2)
S(t1)
]
[I(t2) + S(t2)− I(t1)− S(t1)] , (4)
in which S(t), I(t) and R(t) represent the usual quantities in Kermack and McKendrick’s SIR
model [13] and they are evaluated at either end of an interval, [t1, t2], in the formula.
Expedience was the motivation for using this slightly unorthodox method, however, not only
have so-called individual level models, such as those of [9] and [11], been discredited by [11]
as a means for calculating r0, they are also far more laborious than the simple method used in
this work.
Notice that this formula also appears to be fairly robust. Take any movement of I(t) by an
additive constant, up or down, for example. Such movement has no effect on the calculation of
r0, whatsoever. This is important as the infection data, more than any other, are often plagued
by exactly this problem. In fact, the formula, Equation (4), is reasonably robust against any
data error that does not effect the relative values, or slopes of the functions concerned. This
will be borne out when exploring the use of a multiplicative factor on the data.
5 Calculation of the Threshold and S∞
It is instructive to know both the threshold, as well as the point at which all infection would
cease. Both are calculated from r0 and the relevant theory is provided in [12]. If the susceptable
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fraction of the population is still above 1
r0
, for a given regime, the epidemic will continue to
grow in the way of infections. Only at the threshold does r-effective drop to unity and the
infections subsequently decline. Once r0 has been calculated, S(t2) = S∞, can be recovered
from Equation (4), by considering that S∞ is the point at which all infection ceases, i.e. by
setting I(t2) = 0, in Equation (4).
6 Results
Since the rules in place at the time of the peak were most similar to level 4, the values of b and
a explored were mostly selected on the basis that they manufacture an erroneously-detected,
99.3 % threshold for level 4. The results, as well as the inputs from which they were obtained,
are provided on pages 9 to 11.
7 Conclusions
The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic was, very likely, a lot closer to its threshold than the South African
data suggested, however, some, possibly external, factor still changed the value of r0. The
author’s opinion is therefore that the contemplated data-deficiencies are unlikely to explain the
early peak in the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic on their own. If deficient data did, indeed, play a
role, then the more compelling of the two phenomena might be that the true level of infection
has been underestimated by a multiplicative factor. It is already a documented phenomenon
and it is mathematically less disruptive. The existance of a significant, imperceptible, immune
fraction of the population quickly drives r0 up, admittedly not necessarily to unprecedented
levels, however, in so doing, it moves thresholds to even lower values. In contrast, there is very
little difference between perceived and true r0’s, should infections have been underestimated
by a factor. It is also already a widely recognised phenomenon that the SARS-CoV-2 virus is
often insiduous and infection data are incorrect by a substantial factor, whereas a pre-existing,
imperceptible immune fraction of the population remains nothing more than a hypothetical
construct; a mere thought experiment for the present.
The phenomenon of infections having been underestimated by a multiplicative factor, alone, is
unable to comprehensively explain the SARS-CoV-2 peak observed in the South African data,
without contemplating improbably-high values. Yet, those improbably-high values (a = 60)
might be possible in an area like Khayalitsha, considering that a massive 57 % of the inhabitants
of Mumbai slum areas tested positive [1]. Revising country-wide infections upward by a single
order of magnitude is probably something not too far-fetched and it creates a level-4 threshold
of 59.0 % that would be erroneously-detected as being 95.9 %, a perceived value not too far
from the actual 99.3 % peak observed (see Table 3). It comes a long way to reconciling the
observed with the predicted and it remains an inescapable fact that, in July, r0 did change fairly
abruptly in all the contemplated scenarios of data-deficiency. This is not something suggestive
of a threshold.
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Around the 13th of July, it seems likely that something changed the value of r0 significantly.
Perhaps one criticism of the [12] analysis of lockdown regimes is that it denies the public at
large their humanity. The quantification of lockdown regimes means nothing if the rules aren’t
complied with. Perhaps, by the 13th of July, the population’s assymptotic compliance had
reached the necessary level? Perhaps, too, the intrahousehold infections that obviously took
place early on in the lockdowns, had also run their course? How much genetic drift took place
in the preceding months is yet another unanswered question. Perhaps, when the prohibition
was reimposed, the seemingly-endless supply of liquor, that had understandably leaked from
the stricken hospitality industry, had finally dried up? All these factors could have contributed
to lowering the level-3.5 r0 to below the level-4 value of 1.69, driving the erroneously-detected
95.9 % (Table 3) closer to the 99.3 % peak observed. However, could all of this have driven the
1.69 down as far as 1.08, the r0-value necessary for the 99.3 % perception? The fact remains
that level 3’s r0 was very much lower than 1.08. It was 0.71 for a = 10 and b = 0 (Table 3)!
This was no threshold.
One external factor possibly worth considering is the change in weather that coincided with
the reinstatement of the prohibition and curfew. On the 13th of July, winter arrived in force,
imposing a lockdown of its very own. A massive frontal system made its landfall, bringing
snow to all six provinces of what is, traditionally, a warm country. Braais were called off.
Many shack-dwellers were confined to their blankets. Large groups no longer gathered on
street corners and outside certain houses to ‘bounce’ liquor and cigrettes. The streets emptied
out and finally became deserted. No late-night figure even darted between the throbbing blue
houses. People wore their masks to stay warm. Exactly five days later, on the 18th of July, the
incidence of SARS-CoV-2 cases peaked (the mean SARS-CoV-2 incubation period is 5.2 days
[14]) and the number of active infections followed suit on the 23rd of July. Could something so
simple be the explanation? The author is, otherwise, at a loss. It should be borne in mind that
the model used is ideally intended for homogenous populations, settlements like Khayalitsha,
not really whole countries.
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